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Although regulatory agencies have been created all over the world in the past decade, their design may 
vary considerably. In this report, we offer more insight into the variation in design by presenting the 
findings of a worldwide survey among regulators in seven policy areas: competition, energy, 
environmental, financial market, food safety, pharmaceutical and telecommunication policy. On the 
basis of the answers of 175 regulatory agencies from 88 countries, we conclude that although their 
design shows huge variation, a picture of the modal regulator can be drawn. The modal regulator is 
managed by a head and board members who serve for a fixed and renewable term of five years, who 
can be dismissed for reasons unrelated to their decisions, who cannot hold other offices in the public 
administration, and who need to be formally independent. The regulator is typically obliged to submit 
to politicians an annual report, whilst politicians can give the regulator policy instructions, can start an 
inquiry into the regulator’s operations, and can control the budget. Finally, the regulator is formally 
independent, has exclusive competence, decides on its own internal organisation and personnel policy, 
and makes policy decisions which cannot be reversed by another body than a court. 
Keywords 
Administrative law, structure of government, public administration, independent regulatory agencies  
1 
1. Introduction 
In March this year, we sent an e-mail to about 500 regulatory agencies all over the world to ask them 
to participate in a survey dealing with their governance patterns. The organisations which we 
approached were operating in seven policy areas; namely competition, energy, environmental, 
financial market, food safety, pharmaceutical and telecommunication policy. Their contact details we 
had derived from the membership lists of international networks of regulatory agencies.
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The survey we sent to the regulatory agencies addressed questions on a variety of aspects of the 
design of these agencies. In addition to some general questions on the size of the organisation, and the 
year of establishment, we asked about the provisions for the appointment of the chief executive and 
the board members, about the obligations of the agencies towards governments and parliaments, and 
about provisions for the decision-making process, for the internal organisation, and for the finances of 
the agency. The survey has mainly been build upon a previous survey on regulatory agencies, which 
was created by Fabrizio Gilardi and carried out in a European setting almost a decade ago.
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Members of 175 regulatory agencies from 88 countries have completed the survey. We would like 
to thank all the individuals who took the time to fill in the survey for their respective organisations. 
Their answers to the survey questions – and the additional information on the design of the 
organisations which many of the respondents sent us – have greatly improved our understanding of 
regulatory agencies, their activities, and their environment. In this report, we present the findings of 
the survey on the different items which were incorporated in it. Although the findings of the survey 
cannot just be generalised to the whole population of regulatory agencies, we believe that, given the 
rather high response rate of about 35 percent, and the precision with which most surveys were filled 
in, we are able to draw a quite accurate picture of what regulatory agency around the world look like 
in terms of design.  
The report proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present general information on the agencies 
which participated in order to give an impression of the kind of agencies we describe in this report. 
The third section deals with the provisions related to the appointment and the position of the chief 
executive of the agency. In the fourth section similar provisions for members of the board of the 
agency are discussed. The fifth section elaborates upon the relationship between regulatory agencies 
and governments and parliaments, followed by a section on the provisions for the decision-making 
process, the internal organisation, and the finances of the regulatory agencies. We conclude the report 
with a section in which we describe what can be regarded as the "modal regulator" – that is, the 
regulatory agency which would emerge if the most common features were combined.  
Before turning to the survey findings, we would like to express our gratitude to a number of people 
who supported the project. We would like to thank Professors Adrienne Héritier and Jean-Michel 
Glachant at the European University Institute for their endorsement of the survey. Furthermore, the 
survey has greatly benefited from the feedback of the researchers at the Florence School of 
Regulation, particularly Yannick Perez, and the comments of our colleagues at the Department of 
Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute, notably Alexander Trechsel, Till 
                                                      
1  For competition, the International Competition Network; for energy, the International Energy Regulation Network; for 
the environment, the European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law 
(IMPEL); for financial markets, the International Organization of Securities Commissions; for food safety, the Global 
forum of food safety regulators; for pharmaceuticals, the International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities; and 
for telecommunications, the International Telecommunication Union. 
2  Fabrizio Gilardi. "Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical 
Analysis." Journal of European Public Policy 2002, 9 (6): 873-93. Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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Weber, Sergi Pardos, Joost Berkhout, Mads Dagnis, Carolien van Ham, Costanza Hermanin, Kaat 
Smets, Michaël Tatham, and Elias Dinas. Thank you all for your input! 
2. General information on the regulators 
In this section, we will provide some general information on the regulatory agencies which have 
participated in the survey. As mentioned before, we sent the survey to regulators operating in seven 
areas: competition, energy, environmental, financial market, food safety, pharmaceutical, and 
telecommunication policy. Table 2.1 indicates that out of the 175 regulatory agencies which have 
responded to our request, the group of competition authorities is most populous: these authorities 
represent almost one third of the responding agencies. Next in line are the financial market regulators, 
which constitute slightly more than 18 percent of the respondents, followed by the energy and 
telecommunication regulators, which both represent slightly less than 18 percent. The pharmaceutical 
regulators, subsequently, constitute some seven percent of the organisations. And finally, both the 
food safety and environmental regulators make up of four percent of the sample. 
Table 2.1: Participating regulatory agencies: type 
Type of regulator Number  Percentage 
Competition authority 54  30.9 
Financial market regulator 32  18.3 
Energy regulator 31  17.7 
Telecom regulator 31  17.7 
Pharmaceuticals regulator 13  7.4 
Food safety regulator 7  4.0 
Environmental regulator 7  4.0 
Total 175 100 
Table 2.2, on the next page, presents the list of countries and political units in which the regulatory 
agencies operate. The agencies have their seats in 88 different countries and political units from all 
continents. For most of the units, we have only one participating agency. However, some are present 
in the sample with more organisations, notably Ireland with no less than six regulators, and Brazil, 
Denmark, Hungary, and Latvia with five regulators.  Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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Table 2.2: Participating regulatory agencies: country or political unit 
Country Number Country Number 
Albania 1  Latvia 5 
Algeria 1  Lithuania 3 
Armenia 1  Luxembourg 4 
Australia 2  Macedonia 2 
Austria 1  Madagascar 1 
Azerbaijan 1  Malawi 1 
Barbados 1  Mali 1 
Belgium 3  Malta 2 
Bhutan 1  Mauritania 1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1  Mexico 2 
Brazil 5  Moldova 1 
Canada 1  Mongolia 4 
Chile 1  Montenegro 1 
Colombia 2  Nepal 1 
Costa Rica  1  Netherlands 3 
Cyprus 3  New  Zealand 2 
Czech Republic  2  Nicaragua 1 
Denmark 5  Norway 3 
Dominican Republic  1  Pakistan 1 
Ecuador 1  Panama 2 
Egypt 1  Peru 2 
El Salvador  1  Poland 1 
Estonia 4  Portugal 2 
Finland 3  Qatar 1 
France 4  Romania 3 
Gambia 1  Russia 1 
Germany  3  San Tomé and Principe 1 
Ghana 1  Saudi  Arabia 1 
Gibraltar 1  Serbia 3 
Greece 1  Slovak  Republic 4 
Greenland 1  Slovenia 3 
Grenada 1  South  Africa 2 
Honduras 1  Spain 3 
Hungary 5  St.  Lucia 1 
Iceland 2  Suriname 1 
Ireland 6  Sweden 3 
Israel 2  Switzerland 2 
Italy 2  Taiwan 2 
Jamaica 1  Trinidad  and  Tobago 1 
Japan 1  Turkey 1 
Jersey 2  Uganda 1 
Jordan 2  United  Kingdom 2 
Kenya  4  United States of America 3 
Kiribati 1  Uzbekistan 1 
Korea (Republic of)  1  Zambia 2 
   Total  number 175 Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff which work for the agencies is 266 (based on 
the answers to this question of 160 out of the 175 organisations), but the variation is extremely high. 
That is, the organisation with least full-time equivalent staff only has one FTE position, whilst the 
organisation with most staff has 3240 FTE employees.  
Furthermore, the participating agencies are very young organisations. As demonstrated in Table 
2.3, many of them are established fairly recently. Some 38 percent of the agencies have been 
established in the past nine years, and almost half of the organisations were established in the 1990s 
(47 percent). Besides, five percent of the agencies have been set up in the 1980s, and the percentages 
are still lower for the period before the 1980s.  
Table 2.3: Participating regulatory agencies: establishment per decennium 
  Frequency Percentage 
Before 1940 1  0.6 % 
In the 1940s 3  1.8 % 
In the 1950s 3  1.8 % 
In the 1960s 5  3.1 % 
In the 1970s 4  2.5 % 
In the 1980s 8  4.9 % 
In the 1990s 77  47.2 % 
After 2000 62  38.0 % 
Total number of answers 163  100% 
No answer to this question 12   
3. The chief executive 
The executive heads are often the main actors responsible for the decisions of the regulatory agency. 
We therefore addressed in the survey a number of questions on the procedure leading to the 
appointment of this official, and the provisions of the appointment. How is the chief executive 
appointed and nominated, and for what term does he or she serve? And what are the provisions for 
dismissal, for independence, and for holding other offices?  
The first questions relate to the nature of the term of executive head. In Table 3.1, the answers to 
the question of whether the agency head serves for a fixed term are shown. The vast majority of the 
heads of regulatory agencies (65 percent) serve for a fixed term which is always the same term. About 
one fifth of the heads do not serve for a fixed term (21 percent), whilst the remaining heads (14 
percent) serve for a fixed term which is determined by the appointing body.  
Table 3.1: Does the head of the agency serve for a fixed term? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes, and the term length is always the same 111  65.3 % 
Yes, but the appointing body can choose the term length  24  14.1 % 
No, there is no fixed term 35  20.6 % 
Total number of answers 170  100 % 
No answer to this question 5   
 Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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Table 3.2: If there is a fixed term, how long is it? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Less than two years 2  1.6 % 
Two years 2  1.6 % 
Three years 10  7.9 % 
Four years 19  15.1 % 
Five years 57  45.2 % 
Six years 22  17.5 % 
Seven years 11  8.7 % 
Eight years 1  0.8 % 
Nine years 1  0.8 % 
Ten years 1  0.8 % 
Total number of answers 126  100% 
No fixed term, or not always the same 44   
No answer to this question 5   
In Table 3.2, the term length is indicated for the heads which serve for a fixed term.
3 Most of the 
agency heads with a fixed term serve for a term of five years (45 percent). Besides being the modal 
term length, 5.0 years is also the mean term length of the agency heads (not indicated in the table). 
Also fairly common are the term lengths close to five years: six years (18 percent), four years (15 
percent), seven years (9 percent), and three years (8 percent). Rare though are term lengths shorter 
than three years, or longer than seven years.  
Table 3.3 shows that agency heads can usually be appointed for a new term as well. In the majority 
of the cases, the appointment is renewable more than once (53 percent), and in about a third of the 
cases, this is a once-only possibility. In 14 percent of the cases, the appointment cannot be renewed at 
all.  
Table 3.3: Is the appointment of the agency head renewable? 
  Frequency Percentage 
No 22 13.6  % 
Yes, once 55  34.0 % 
Yes, more than once 85  52.5 % 
Total number of answers 162  100 % 
No answer to this question 13   
 
                                                      
3  Whereas some of the agencies with a head who serves for a term determined by the appointing body indicated that this 
question is not applicable for them, some others answered this question by indicating what the current term length is. As 
a consequence, the number of answers on the term length (126) is higher than the number of agencies in which the head 
always serves for the same term (111). Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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Table 3.4: Who appoints the head of the agency? 
  Frequency Percentage 
The head of the state 30  17.9 % 
One or two ministers 42  25.0 % 
The government 39  23.2 % 
The parliament 20  11.9 % 
The government and parliament combined 8  4.8 % 
The members of the board of the agency 19  11.3 % 
Another non-elected body 10  6.0 % 
Total number of answers 168  100 % 
No answer to this question 7   
Next we asked a number of questions on who appoints and nominates the agency head. Table 3.4 
indicates that most of the agency heads are appointed by one or two ministers (25 percent), followed 
by the government as a whole (23 percent), and the head of the state (18 percent). Quite some heads 
are also appointed by the parliament (12 percent), and by the members of the agency board (11 
percent). Less common are appointments by other non-elected bodies, such as ministries or specific 
public service appointment committees (6 percent), and appointments by the government and 
parliament combined (5 percent).  
For most of the regulatory agencies, appointments are preceded by nominations of one or more 
candidates, which are normally issued by bodies other than the appointing ones. Table 3.5 indicates 
that candidates are usually nominated by a political body. Nominations are most often issued by a 
minister (34 percent). Other common political nominators are the government as a whole (18 percent), 
a combination of government and parliament (6 percent), and the head of the state (5 percent). Less 
common are nominations by the parliament only (3 percent), and by a minister in combination with a 
non-elected body (3 percent). Non-political bodies are also often involved as nominators, and they are 
involved more often as the nominators than as appointing bodies. In about 15 percent of the cases, the 
board of the agency is the nominator, whilst another 16 percent have as nominators such bodies as 
ministerial departments, courts, specifically designated recruitment services, and other regulatory 
agencies. 
Table 3.5: Who nominates the head of the agency? 
  Frequency Percentage
The head of the state 6  5.0 % 
One or two ministers 41  33.9 % 
The government 22  18.2 % 
The parliament 4  3.3 % 
The government and parliament combined 7  5.8 % 
A minister or president in combination with a non-elected body  4  3.3 % 
The members of the board of the agency 18  14.9 % 
Another non-elected body  19  15.7 % 
Total number of answers 121  100 % 
There are no nominations 46   
No answer to this question 6   Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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The provisions on the bindingness of the nominations differ considerably across agencies. Table 3.6 
shows that for almost 40 percent of the agencies which have nominations, such nominations are non-
binding, and can hence be ignored by the appointing body. In these instances, and in the instances in 
which there are no nominees whatsoever, the appointing body is the decisive body during the 
appointment procedure. In about a quarter of the cases, nominations cannot be ignored by the 
appointing body, and the nominator consequently has considerable influence on the appointments. 
Finally, in many cases, no specific provisions for the bindingness of nominations are included in the 
legislation or statutes which govern the agency (36 percent).  
Table 3.6: Can the nomination be ignored by the appointer? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 40 39.2  % 
No 25 24.5  % 
No specific provisions 37  36.3 % 
Total number of answers 102  100 % 
There are no nominations 46   
No answer to this question 27   
Related to the appointment question is the question of whether the chief executive can be dismissed 
(see Table 3.7). The most common provision here is the permission of dismissal of the head, but only 
for reasons not related to policy decisions made by the agency (52 percent). Hence the head can be 
dismissed in the case of malfeasance or misuse of powers, but not for reasons of incompatibility of 
agency decisions with political preferences. Somewhat less common are provisions which enable the 
dismissal of the agency head for a variety of reasons including, in principle, reasons related to the 
policy decisions of the agency. Furthermore, some agencies do not have any dismissal provisions (13 
percent), whilst some others do not at all allow the dismissal of the chief executive.  
Table 3.7: Can the head of the agency be dismissed? 
  Frequency Percentage
S/he cannot be dismissed 9  5.4 % 
S/he can be dismissed, but only for reasons unrelated to policy 87  52.4 % 
S/he can be dismissed for all kind of reasons 49  29.5 % 
No specific provisions for dismissal 21  12.7 % 
Total number of answers 166  100 % 
No answer to this question 9   
Finally, we addressed some questions related to the degree to which chief executives are required to 
discharge their task independently. We first of all asked whether he or she can hold other offices in 
addition to the office of chief executive of the agency. In Table 3.8, it is shown that the vast majority 
of the heads are not allowed to hold other offices in the public administration (70 percent). 
Furthermore, of the heads who are allowed to hold other offices, most need to get the permission of 
the executive branch in order to do so (10 percent), and some do not need such permission (6 percent). 
In another 15 percent of the cases, the legislation or statutes of the agency do not include any 
provisions related to holding other offices. For the appointment of most of the agency heads, 
independence is also a formal requirement. As presented in Table 3.9, almost two thirds of the heads 
are required to be independent, whilst the remaining one thirds are not subject to such an obligation.  Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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Table 3.8: Can the head of the agency hold other offices in the public administration? 
  Frequency Percentage 
No 116 69.5  % 
Yes, but only with the permission of the executive branch 16  9.6 % 
Yes 10 6.0  % 
No specific provisions for other offices 25  15.0 % 
Total number of answers 167  100 % 
No answer to this question 8   
Table 3.9: Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 105 64.4  % 
No 58 35.6  % 
Total number of answers 163  100 % 
No answer to this question 12   
4. The members of the board 
The chief executive is usually not the only one responsible for the conduct of the regulatory agency: 
he or she is assisted by the (other) board members. While the head and board members are sometimes 
collectively responsible for the agency’s decisions, they are otherwise each responsible for specified 
aspects of the agency’s activities. In both cases though, board members hold key positions in the 
agency. Therefore we included in the survey the same battery of questions which dealt with the 
provision for the agency heads. In this section, we will discuss the answers to the questions on the 
appointment procedure of the board members, and the provisions attached to their position. Overall, it 
should be noted, the provisions for the board members closely resemble those for the chief executives.  
Table 4.1: Does the agency have a board? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 134 78.4  % 
No 37 21.6  % 
Total number of answers 171  100 % 
No answer to this question 4   
Table 4.1, first of all, shows the answers to the question of whether an agency has a board. Almost 80 
percent of the agencies which sent us a completed survey have such a board. The remaining ones, a 
little less than 22 percent, have a single executive who manages the organisation.  Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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Table 4.2: Do the board members serve for a fixed term? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes, and the term length is always the same 107  79.9 % 
Yes, but the appointing body can choose the term length  17  12.7 % 
No, there is no fixed term 10  7.5 % 
Total number of answers 134  100 % 
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 4   
Like in the case of agency heads, the majority of the board members – some 80 percent – serve for a 
fixed term which is always the same (see Table 4.2). The remaining 20 percent of the board members 
either serve for a fixed term which is determined by the appointing body (13 percent), or do not at all 
serve for a fixed term (8 percent). 
As demonstrated in Table 4.3, the term lengths for the board member are centred around five years 
(33 percent) and four years (22 percent).
4 The mean term length of the board members (not presented 
in the table) is 4.6 years, and hence also lies in between these two categories. The term lengths around 
these two numbers – that is, terms of three years (18 percent) and six years (14 percent) – are also 
common. However, terms shorter than three years, or longer than six years, can hardly be found.  
Table 4.3: If there is a fixed term, how long is it? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Less than two years 1  0.9 % 
Two years 4  3.5 % 
Three years 21  18.3 % 
Four years 25  21.7 % 
Five years 38  33.0 % 
Six years 16  13.9 % 
Seven years 8  7.0 % 
Nine years 1  0,9 % 
Ten years 1  0.9 % 
Total number of answers 115  100% 
No fixed term, or not always the same 15   
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 8   
After serving for their term, most of the board members can be appointed for a new term. In Table 4.4, 
it is demonstrated that a little less than 40 percent of the members can be appointed once more, whilst 
a majority can be reappointed more than once. In only 7 percent of the cases, board members are not 
allowed to serve for more than one term.  
                                                      
4  Also here, some of the agencies with board members serving for terms determined by the appointing body indicated that 
this question is not applicable for them, whilst some others answered this question by indicating what the current term 
length is. As a consequence, the number of answers on the term length (115) is higher than the number of agencies in 
which the board members always serves for the same term (107). Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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Table 4.4: Is the appointment of the board members renewable? 
  Frequency Percentage 
No 9 6.8  % 
Yes, once 52  39.4 % 
Yes, more than once 71  53.8 % 
Total number of answers 132  100 % 
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 6   
As shown in Table 4.5, the members of the board are appointed by a wide range of actors. The 
government is the most common appointing body (28 percent), followed by one or two ministers (25 
percent), the parliament (16 percent), the head of the state (14 percent), and parliament and 
government combines (8 percent). Appointments by non-elected bodies, such as the head of the 
agency or specifically designated officials at the ministry, are much less habitual.  
Table 4.5: Who appoints the board members of the agency? 
  Frequency Percentage 
The head of the state 18  13.7 % 
One or two ministers 33  25.2 % 
The government 37  28.2 % 
The parliament 21  16.0 % 
The government and parliament combined 10  7.6 % 
A combination of elected and unelected bodies 3  2.3 % 
The head of the agency 6  4.6 % 
Another non-elected body 3  2.3 % 
Total number of answers 131  100 % 
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 7   
The appointment of board members is usually preceded by nominations of one or more candidates. As 
Table 4.6 demonstrates, the nature of the nominators varies considerably. The nominators are 
frequently elected bodies: one or two ministers (28 percent), the government as a whole (23 percent), 
or the government and parliament combined (10 percent). Nevertheless, non-elected bodies are also 
very often the nominators, although they are hardly ever the appointing bodies. In about 10 percent of 
the cases, the other board members nominate candidate colleagues. Moreover, in about 17 percent of 
the cases, other non-elected bodies are the nominators. The bodies to which this category mainly refers 
are regulated industries which have been granted the task to nominate.  Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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Table 4.6: Who nominates the board members of the agency? 
  Frequency Percentage 
The head of the state 2  2.0 % 
One or two ministers 29  28.4 % 
The government 24  23.5 % 
The parliament 4  3.9 % 
The government and parliament combined 10  9.8 % 
A combination of elected and unelected bodies 6   5.9 % 
The head or members of the board of the agency 10  9.8 % 
Another non-elected body 17  16.7 % 
Total number of answers 102  100 % 
There are no nominations 31   
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 5   
Nevertheless, important though nominations may be, they can quite often be ignored by the appointing 
body (see Table 4.7). In the case that candidates are nominated for the position of board members, 
such nominations can be ignored in almost 40 percent of the cases. In those cases, and in the cases in 
which there are no nominations at all, the appointing body is the decisive body in determining who 
will take a seat in the board. Furthermore, in 38 percent of the cases, there are no provision on the 
bindingness of the nominations. Finally, almost a quarter of the nominations are binding for the 
appointing body. Here the balance of power in the appointment process is much more in favour of the 
nominator.  
Table 4.7: Can the nomination be ignored by the appointer? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 36 38.7  % 
No 22 23.7  % 
No specific provisions 35  37.6 % 
Total number of answers 93  100 % 
There are no nominations 31   
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 14   
 Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
12 
Table 4.8: Can the board members of the agency be dismissed? 
  Frequency Percentage
S/he cannot be dismissed 9  6.8 % 
S/he can be dismissed, but only for reasons unrelated to policy 67  50.4 % 
S/he can be dismissed for all kind of reasons 33  24.8 % 
No specific provisions for dismissal 24  18.0 % 
Total number of answers 133  100 % 
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 5   
In Table 4.8, the dismissal provisions for board members are summarised. Only few instances of board 
members who cannot be dismissed at all can be found (7 percent). Furthermore, of the provisions 
which enable dismissal, the one allowing for dismissal only for reasons unrelated to policy is most 
common (50 percent). In about a quarter of the cases, board members can be dismissal for all kinds of 
reasons, including reasons related to the policy decisions of the agency. Finally, many agencies do not 
have any provisions for the dismissal of board members.  
Table 4.9: Can the board members hold other offices in the public administration? 
  Frequency Percentage 
No 58 44.3  % 
Yes, but only with the permission of the executive branch 8  6.1 % 
Yes 56 42.7  % 
No specific provisions for other offices 9  6.9 % 
Total number of answers 131  100 % 
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 7   
Finally, we addressed, also for the board members, some questions related to the degree to which the 
board members are required to perform their task independently. In contrast to chief executives, board 
members are quite often allowed to hold other offices in the public administration (see Table 4.9). And 
while some 6 percent of the board members need to get permission from the executive branch to do so, 
43 percent can hold other offices without needing to get permission. Nevertheless, although the 
percentage is much lower than for the chief executives, many board members are not allowed to hold 
other offices in the public administration. Also potentially important for the independent functioning 
of the board members are statutory provisions which provide for the independence of these officials. 
As Table 4.10 shows, for a vast majority of the positions of board members, independence is indeed a 
formal requirement (60 percent). 
Table 4.10: Is independence a formal requirement for the appointment? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 78 60.0  % 
No 52 40.0  % 
Total number of answers 130  100 % 
There is no board 37   
No answer to this question 8   Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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5. The relationship with government and parliament 
Regulatory agencies have typically been granted their policy competence by governments and 
parliament. As these political bodies are often to some extent responsible for activities in the policy 
area in question, they will still have some interest in the activities of regulatory agencies. To learn 
more about the relation between regulatory agencies and governments and parliaments, we introduced 
in the survey a number of questions on this topic. We addressed both questions on the obligations of 
the agencies towards governments and parliaments, and on the powers of the political bodies vis-à-vis 
regulatory agencies.  
Table 5.1: What are the agency’s obligations towards the government? 
  Frequency Percentage
No formal obligations 44  26.5 % 
Submission of an annual report, for information only 76  45.8 % 
Submission of a report more than once a year, for information only 4  2.4 % 
Submission of an annual report, approval needed 24  14.5 % 
Submission of a report more than once a year, approval needed 12  7.2 % 
The agency has to report on request 6  3.6 % 
Total number of answers 166  100 % 
No answer to this question 9   
Table 5.2: What are the agency’s obligations towards the parliament? 
  Frequency Percentage
No formal obligations 51  30.9 % 
Submission of an annual report, for information only 73  44.2 % 
Submission of a report more than once a year, for information only 1  0.6 % 
Submission of an annual report, approval needed 26  15.8 % 
Submission of a report more than once a year, approval needed 6  3.6 % 
The agency has to report on request 8  4.8 % 
Total number of answers 165  100 % 
No answer to this question 10   
In Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the reporting requirements of regulatory agencies are presented. In general, the 
distribution of answers over the different categories is quite similar for obligations towards the 
government and the parliament. The most common requirement, both towards the government (46 
percent) and the parliament (44 percent), is the requirement to submit an annual activity report for the 
information of the political body. Furthermore, agencies often have no obligations at all towards 
political bodies, and this absence of requirements is more common vis-à-vis the parliament (31 
percent) than vis-à-vis the government (27 percent). Still frequently, regulators have to submit an 
annual report which needs to be approved by the political body in question: 15 percent of the 
regulators have such an obligation towards the government, whilst 16 percent have this obligation 
towards their parliament. Uncommon though are obligations to submit a report more than once a year. 
This obligation is nevertheless somewhat less exceptional for reports which need to be approved than 
for reports which have to be submitted for information only. Finally, some agencies are obliged to 
report on request to government and/or parliament (about 4 percent in both cases).  
Subsequently, we asked whether governments and parliaments can give the agency general policy 
instructions; that is, policy instructions which refer to general rules rather than the application of these Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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rules in particular cases. As Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicate, provisions which allow for such general 
policy instructions are much more common for governments (41 percent) than for parliament (25 
percent). At the same time, such general policy instructions are quite often not a possibility for 
governments (41 percent) or for parliaments (46 percent). Besides, provisions for policy instructions 
do frequently not enter in the design of agencies at all (in 18 percent of the cases for government 
instructions; in 29 percent of the cases for parliamentary instructions).  
Table 5.3: Can the government give the agency general policy instructions? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 67 40.6  % 
No 68 41.2  % 
No specific provisions 30  18.2 % 
Total number of answers 165  100 % 
No answer to this question 10   
Table 5.4: Can the parliament give the agency general policy instructions? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 47 24.5  % 
No 75 46.0  % 
No specific provisions 48  29.4 % 
Total number of answers 163  100 % 
No answer to this question 12   
We were also interested in the question whether governments and parliament can start inquiries into 
the operations of the agency. As Tables 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate, such provisions are quite common, 
though somewhat more common for governments (45 percent) than for parliaments (38 percent). 
Nevertheless, in a majority of the cases, inquiries into the operations of the agencies are not explicitly 
allowed for. That is, inquiries are either not a possibility at all (28 percent for governments; 30 percent 
for parliaments), or are not the subject matter of any provision in the legislation or statutes which 
govern the agency (27 percent for governments; 32 percent for parliaments).  
Table 5.5: Can the government start an inquiry into the agency’s operations? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 75 45.2  % 
No 46 27.7  % 
No specific provisions 45  27.1 % 
Total number of answers 166  100 % 
No answer to this question 9   
 Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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Table 5.6: Can the parliament start an inquiry into the agency’s operations? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 61 37.7  % 
No 49 30.2  % 
No specific provisions 52  32.1 % 
Total number of answers 162  100 % 
No answer to this question 13   
6. Decision-making, internal organisation, and finances 
The final section of the survey dealt with the decision-making process, the internal organisation, and 
the finances of the agencies. First, we asked the general question of whether the independence of the 
agency is formally stated in the legislation or statutes which govern the agency. Table 6.1 shows that 
for the vast majority of the agencies which answered this question (81 percent), the independence is 
indeed formally stated.  
Table 6.1: Is the independence formally stated in legislation or in statute? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 135 81.3  % 
No 31 18.7  % 
Total number of answers 166  100 % 
No answer to this question 9   
Table 6.2: Is there a body other than a court which can overturn decisions? 
  Frequency Percentage 
No, none 105  64.8 % 
Yes, another specialised body 12  7.4 % 
Yes, the government, with qualifications 37  22.8 % 
Yes, the government, without qualifications 7  4.3 % 
Yes, the legislature, without qualifications 1  0.6 % 
Total number of answers 162  100 % 
No answer to this question 13   
Being interested in provisions which may put constraints on decision-making autonomy of the 
agencies, we addressed the question of whether there is a body other than a court which can reverse or 
overturn the decisions of the agency (see Table 6.2). For the vast majority of the agencies (65 percent), 
there is no body other than a court which can do so. In the case that there is a body which can do so, 
this is usually the government, which can overturn decisions with qualifications (23 percent). In such 
instances, the government is allowed to, for instance, block or reverse agency decisions which conflict 
with the national interest. Far less common are provisions which allow for other specialised bodies to 
reverse agency decisions (7 percent), for unqualified overturn of decisions by the government (4 
percent), or for parliament to block decisions (less than 1 percent). Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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Furthermore, we addressed a question on the competence of the agency. The question deals not so 
much with the reach of its competence, but with the exclusiveness of the competence. As Table 6.3 
indicates, a vast majority of the agencies which responded to this question have exclusive competence 
in their regulatory policy area (61 percent). The remainder of the organisations share their 
competences with another body. Some share their competences with another independent authority (18 
percent), others with the government (14 percent), or with the parliament (6 percent). In rare instances, 
the agency only has some consultative competence. 
Table 6.3: Does the agency have exclusive or shared competences? 
  Frequency Percentage
Exclusive competences 99  60.7 % 
It shares competences with another independent authority 29  17.8 % 
It shares competences with the parliament 10  6.1 % 
It shares competences with the government  22  13.5 % 
It only has some consultative competence 3  1.8 % 
Total number of answers 163  100 % 
No answer to this question 12   
Next we asked about the internal organisation of the agency. In an answer to the question which body 
decides upon the internal organisation of the agency, almost 70 percent of the agencies noted that they 
decide on these matters themselves (see Table 6.4). For the remainder of the agencies, these decisions 
are partly made by the government and party by the agency itself (29 percent). Only in rare instances 
are decisions on the internal organisations exclusively made by the government.  
Table 6.4: Which body decides upon the agency’s internal organisation? 
  Frequency Percentage 
The agency alone 111  68.1 % 
Both the agency and the government 48  29.4 % 
The government alone 4  2.5 % 
Total number of answers 163  100 % 
No answer to this question 12   
A similar question dealt with the personnel policy of the agency; that is, the hiring, firing, and 
allocation of the staff of the agency (see Table 6.5). Again, in a vast majority of the cases, agencies 
indicate to be in charge of such matter themselves (76 percent). If this is not the case, personnel policy 
is usually decided upon partly by the agency and partly by the government (23 percent). Only rarely is 
the government solely in charge of the personnel policy of the agency (2 percent).  
Table 6.5: Which body is in charge of the agency’s personnel policy? 
  Frequency Percentage 
The agency alone 124  75.6 % 
Both the agency and the government 37  22.6 % 
The government alone 3  1.8 % 
Total number of answers 164  100 % 
No answer to this question 11   Comparing regulatory agencies. Report on the results of a worldwide survey 
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Finally, we asked about the finances of the agency. First, we addressed the question of what the source 
is of the budget of the agency (see Table 6.6). Here the picture is quite diverse: the answers are neatly 
distributed among the various answer categories. First of all, slightly more than one third of the 
agencies are funded out of fees which are levied upon the regulated industry. Second, somewhat less 
than one third have as their source of income a combination of fees levied upon the industry and 
government grants. And finally, somewhat more than one third see their budget come from 
government grants only.  
Table 6.6: What is the source of the agency’s funding? 
  Frequency Percentage 
Fees levied on the regulated industry 58  35.4 % 
Fees levied on the industry and government grants 47  28.7 % 
Government grants only 59  36.0 % 
Total number of answers 164  100 % 
No answer to this question 11   
Table 6.7: How is the agency’s budget controlled? 
  Frequency Percentage 
By the agency only 31  18.9 % 
By the accounting office or court 32  19.5 % 
By another non-elected body 3  1.8 % 
By both the government and the agency 61  37.2 % 
By the government only 16  9.8 % 
By the parliament only 5  3.0 % 
By government and parliament 4  2.4 % 
By government and/or parliament and accounting office 12  7.3 % 
Total number of answers 164  100 % 
No answer to this question 11   
Second, we were interested in the control of the budget of regulatory agencies. As Table 6.7 shows, a 
wide variety of actors are involved in the control of the budget. In a majority of the cases, a political 
body is somehow involved as a controller. The arrangement which is most common is the one where 
the budget is controlled by a combination of government and agency (37 percent). Furthermore, 
sometimes the government is the sole controlling body (10 percent), sometimes parliament has this 
task (3 percent), and in another small number of cases the government and parliament share the 
controlling task (2 percent). Sometimes also, governments and parliaments share the task of 
controlling the budget with some accounting office (7 percent). More usual though is the provision 
where such accounting offices are the sole controllers (20 percent). Finally, in another 19 percent of 
the cases, the agency itself is the sole body responsible for the control of its budget.  
7. The modal regulatory agency 
As the previous sections indicated, the design of the regulatory agencies that participated in the survey 
varies considerably. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a picture of the modal regulator. In the final 
section of the report, we therefore opted to present the features of the modal regulator (see schedule 
below). The picture that emerges here is one of an autonomously operating organisation, which has Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop 
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nevertheless fairly strong links to government as a consequence of political appointments and 


































The modal regulator 
Provisions for the executive head 
•  Fixed term of office of five years 
•  Appointment renewable more than 
once 
•  Non-binding nomination and 
appointment by ministers 
•  Dismissal possible for reasons 
unrelated to policy 
•  Other offices in the public 
administration not allowed 
•  Independence is a formal 
requirement for the appointment 
Provisions for the board members 
•  Fixed term of office of five years 
•  Appointment renewable more than 
once 
•  Non-binding nomination by ministers, 
appointment by the government 
•  Dismissal possible for reasons 
unrelated to policy 
•  Other offices in the public 
administration not allowed 
•  Independence is a formal requirement 
for the appointment 
Relationship with political bodies 
•  Obligation to submit annual report 
for information 
•  Political bodies can give general 
policy instructions 
•  Political bodies can start an inquiry 
into the agency’s operations 
Decision-making, management, finances
•  Independence formally stated 
•  Decisions cannot be reversed 
•  Decides itself on internal organisation 
and personnel policy 
•  Exclusive competences 
•  Budget either from industry fees or 
government grants 
•  Budget controlled by agency and 
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8. Afterword 
In this report, we have presented the findings of a survey which we carried out on the design and 
governance of regulatory agencies worldwide. Members of 175 different agencies from all over the 
world have participated in the survey, and have generously offered more insight into the design of 
their respective organisations. Based on their answers, we have been able to present a picture of both 
the communalities and the differences in the design of regulatory agencies.  
The findings of the survey have not only been used in order to write this report, but have also 
formed the empirical basis for an academic paper which has been presented recently at two 
international political science conferences.
5 The data will also be used in additional academic papers 
on which we are still working.  
If you have any questions about this report, the data, or our research project, please contact either 
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